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Abstract
In distributed and collaborative attack detection systems decisions are made
on the basis of the events reported by many sensors, e.g., Intrusion Detection
Systems placed across various network locations. In some cases such events
originate at locations over which we have little control, for example because they
belong to an organisation that shares information with us. Blindly accepting
such reports as real encompasses several risks, as sensors might be dishonest,
unreliable or simply compromised. In these situations trust plays an important
role in deciding whether alerts should be believed or not. In this work we present
an approach to maximise the quality of the information gathered in such systems
and the resilience against dishonest behaviours. We introduce the notion of trust
diversity amongst sensors and argue that detection configurations with such a
property perform much better in many respects. Using reputation as a proxy for
trust, we introduce an adaptive scheme to dynamically reconfigure the network
of detection sensors. Experiments confirm an overall increase both in detection
quality and resilience against compromise and misbehaviour.
Keywords: Trust diversity, reputation, adaptive self-configuration, detection
quality, collaborative attack detection
1. Introduction
Many security threats in current computing environments can only be detec-
ted by gathering and correlating evidence obtained at different locations [1, 2].
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In some cases, evidence may come from sources over which we have little control.
This is, for example, the case when organisations choose to share information
about detected security events. In other cases, the integrity of the source may
be questioned, for example if there is evidence that it may be malfunctioning,
exhibiting a dishonest behaviour, or simply compromised.
Whatever the case, gaining such evidence in a prompt and timely manner is
essential for minimising risk exposure. A major challenge in such Collaborative
Intrusion Detection Networks (CIDN) [3, 4] is the ability to properly assess
how much trust we can place in each piece of information and what risks we
incur by believing or not believing it. Blindly accepting each report as truth
is certainly dangerous. Consider, for example, an intelligent adversary who,
after compromising a few detection sensors, forces them to stop sending alerts
related to his intended malicious activities. Conversely, sensors may report too
many false alerts, either to undermine our confidence in them or divert attention
from a more serious event taking place. Ultimately, deciding what to believe
depends on available information about the source and its operational context.
This topic has received too little attention so far, despite being crucial for a
proper functioning of collaborative detection efforts where there is some degree
of distrust amongst parties or regarding the resilience of the sensors against
attack.
In this paper, we propose a scheme aimed at increasing the quality of the
decisions made about pieces of evidence in which we place different degrees of
trust. In our proposal, we first quantify the confidence we place in sensors
behaviour according to how they have behaved in the past, normally referred to
as reputation [5]. However, the use of reputation alone has shortcomings, and
systems based solely on assessments of past behaviour have severe limitations.
We address this issue by introducing the notion of trust diversity. In essence,
trust diversity measures the dispersion among the trust values of a population of
detection sensors placed in a given domain, with low diversity values indicating
that sensors have similar trustworthiness, and vice versa.
We then propose to quantify the quality of a particular sensor placement
through its trust diversity, and to dynamically search for high quality place-
ments. Informally speaking, a high quality placement is one where trusted sen-
sors are deployed in the vicinity of others we have doubts about. Similarly, low
quality placements are those where all sensors have roughly the same trustwor-
thiness. We pursue two main goals with the use of trust diversity as a measure
of placement quality:
1. Firstly, by simultaneously maximising trust diversity across all network
domains we guarantee that no domain is left poorly protected (i.e., moni-
tored exclusively by untrusted sensors).
2. Secondly, since each domain will have sensors with varying trust values,
the most reliable among them can contribute to the assessment of the repu-
tation of others, for example by identifying those that behave differently
when presented with the same events.
The overall result is that sensor placements with a sufficient amount of trust
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diversity exhibit two interesting properties: (i) they facilitate the early identi-
fication of misbehaving sensors, a fact that implicitly contributes to a better
assessment on the truth of the events they generate; and (ii) they are more
resilient to compromise by external attackers.
In our scheme, trust diversity is used to dynamically place sensors when and
where they are most needed, both to lessen uncertainty about what is actually
happening in the network infrastructure and also to make defences more resilient
to threats. Assume, for example, that contradictory events are reported by
sensors in the same network area. If our confidence in all these sources is similar,
we face a problem when deciding what is actually going on. Even if at present
time there is little we can do about this, a careful deployment of alternative or
additional sensors will help to resolve such conflicts in the future and, indirectly,
to re-assess our confidence on the sensors currently deployed there.
As we discuss later, such re-deployments (or re-configurations of the moni-
toring infrastructure) can be triggered under many circumstances, posssibly in
a fully automated reconfigation. This allows defences to react to the presence of
uncertain information by seeking ways of improving their function. We believe
this is a very interesting property for adaptive security systems and a prerequi-
site for self-healing networks.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some
definitions and outlines our system model. Section 3 describes the adaptive
model designed to reduce the uncertainty arising from discrepancies. Section 4
introduces both the reputation system used to assess sensors’ behaviour and the
quantification of trust diversity. Section 5 reports some experimental results
to illustrate how the system can obtain better evidence by maximising trust
diversity. Section 6 discusses related work in this area and, finally, Section 7
summarises our contributions and identifies future research directions.
2. Definitions and system model
Any information system (IS), regardless of the services it offers, can be
modelled on the basis of all the elements tha make up its underlying network.
In this sense, the information system administrator can internally structure
services and resources within a well-defined set of domains (D). Such a grouping
may be based on the site’s security policy and/or some modelling of the services,
e.g., with respect to their type, so as to allow a seamless scalability as the number
of services increases [6]. Governance functions could also be expected to monitor
the proper operation of all services deployed in the information system, thereby
defining a monitoring system as a surveillance centre.
Each domain imposes a set of requirements (R), or liabilities, for the proper
operation of its services and, consequently, for the proper operation of the entire
information system. As these requirements are given by the needs of each ser-
vice, each domain can automatically extract its requirements from those of the
services it contains. Requirements may differ in importance and so, conse-
quently, may their monitoring. The administrator should provide a weight for
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each requirement Rk ∈ R, Imp(Rk) ∈ [0, 1], indicating the impact or impor-
tance on the information system if Rk is compromised.
Using the notation defined earlier, we formally define an information system
with a total number of u requirements that can be demanded by m domains as
follows:
IS = {D1, D2, ..., Dm}
R = {R1, R2, ..., Ru}
R(Di) = {Ri1 , Ri2 , ..., Rix}
where each domain Di ∈ IS (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is defined in accordance with its
needs with x requirements (x ≤ u) for the proper operation of its services.
An example of a generic information system is depicted in Figure 1. Note
that this figure includes some other concepts not yet defined, belonging to the
monitoring system, that will be formally introduced later.
Information System
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MRP = { ( R1, { P1 } ), ( R2, { P2 } ), ( R3, { P3, P4 } ) }
SP = { ( S1, D2 ), ( S2, D3 ), ( S3, D2 ), ( S4, D3 ), ( S5, D3 ), ( S6, D1 ), ( S7, D1 ) }
IS = { D1, D2 , D3 }
Figure 1: Example of a monitoring configuration for a generic information system
This information system illustrates a distribution of the services in three
domains, IS = {D1, D2, D3}. The information system administrator has defined
three requirements, R = {R1, R2, R3}, that have to be monitored to determine
the proper operation of the system, with R(D1) = {R1, R2}, R(D2) = {R2, R3}
and R(D3) = {R1, R2, R3}. In turn, each domain specifies the impact associated
(Imp) with each requirement if these are not satisfied.
For the detection of security events, we assume that the information system
has at its disposal a limited set S of n sensors, with n≫ m so as to have a great
variety of monitoring points. Such sensors will be configured and deployed into
domains in order to check if services are properly working and if they are under
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attack. Thus, their main activity is to send events –alerts, notifications– upon
malfunctioning or attack attempts, covering both dependability and security
functions (i.e., to ensure that users can make use of all services offered, and
that this is done securely).
Each sensor is characterised by a set of properties, or capabilities, that it
can offer to monitor requirements. For example, an application-layer Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) might be capable of detecting HTTP-based attacks
only, while others could detect threats based on network and transport protocols.
For each sensor Sj ∈ S a reputation value is also maintained, Rep(Sj) ∈ [0, 1],
that models its behaviour according to the assessment of all the information
sent (or not) by the sensor so far. The higher the reputation, the higher the
belief that the information provided by the sensor is true. Section 4.3 further
discusses how to compute and update this reputation.
We now formally define the set of v supported properties that the n sensors
can provide to the information system as follows:
S = {S1, S2, ..., Sn}
P = {P1, P2, ..., Pv}
P (Sj) = {Pj1 , Pj1 , ..., Pjy}
where each sensor Sj ∈ S (1 ≤ j ≤ n) can be modelled according to the y
properties (y ≤ v) it supports at a given time to monitor some requirements.
In Figure 1, seven sensors for monitoring purposes have been defined, i.e.,
S = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7}, including the definition of their properties ex-
tracted from the total set of properties defined by the system administrator as
P = {P1, P2, P3, P4}. Note that sensors are configured by activating or deacti-
vating the specified properties as the system considers appropriate.
We can notice in Figure 1 that there is a direct relationship between each
property offered by a sensor and the monitoring requirements demanded by
the system, which has also been included in Figure 1. The mapping amongst
requirements and properties (MRP) defines which sensor properties can monitor
the proper operation of a requirement:
MRP = {(Rk, Pw) | Rk ⇔ Pw, Pw = {P1, P2, ..., Pl}}
where Pw ⊆ P (1 ≤ l ≤ v) is the set of properties needed to satisfy the k-th
requirement, with Rk ∈ R (1 ≤ k ≤ u).
In order to illustrate the use of the concepts introduced above, consider
the following scenario where a collaborative intrusion detection network will be
deployed in a system:
• A domain is defined by each network segment in the information system.
• A requirement corresponds to an attack class that each service deployed in
a network may suffer, for example a privilege escalation attack or a denial
of service (DoS) attempt.
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• A sensor is an IDS capable of analysing the traffic that flows through a
network segment –domain– or the activity produced in a host.
• Properties are particular configurations of an IDS to detect attack classes,
depending on its detection techniques. These can be either signature-based
detection rules (misuse detection) or policies that model normal system
behaviour (anomaly detection). In both cases, a set of rules –properties–
are used to monitor some of the demanded attack types and to provide
alerts about the compromise of a requirement.
2.1. Monitoring system
As sensors are services too, with a special purpose in the information system,
their operation needs also to be supervised to check if they are behaving properly
and according to their claimed capabilities [7]. Otherwise, a malfunction of any
of them (or, even worse, the reporting of wrong information due to malicious
behaviour) can compromise the perceived situation about the system security
state. The dangers of undetected attacks are well known. Alternatively, the
incorrect suspicion that there is an ongoing security breach may trigger response
mechanisms that will interfere with the normal operation of the system.
Apart from simple malfunctioning, which can be also regarded to as un-
intentional but improper behaviour, any sensor might maliciously misbehave,
for example after being compromised by an adversary. Sensors may thus feed
the system with bad (bogus) information, or fail to report something that has
actually happened. We distinguish both cases from the usual false positives and
false negatives [8], as they clearly have an intentional nature. These two cases
are widely explained in Section 2.2.
The information system, guided by its monitoring needs, can configure and
deploy sensors at will in different domains to reach the desired goal. This
requires having a placement model where sensors are configured and deployed
in a given domain with the properties enabled for each of them (obviously, each
sensor can only be configured with the properties that it supports). Thus, a
sensor placement (SP) is given by a mapping:
SP = {(Sj , Di) | Sj → Di}
where the j-th sensor, Sj ∈ S (1 ≤ j ≤ n), is deployed in the i-th domain,
Di ∈ D (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
In summary, a monitoring system is defined by making use of: the informa-
tion system components (i.e., IS, R and R(Di)); its specific sets of monitoring
components S and P ; the set of relationships amongst requirements and proper-
ties (MRP); and the sensor placement (SP). Establishing which properties of a
sensor are used to satisfy some of the requirements demanded by the domain
where it is placed, determined by P (Sj), together with all previous information
about the monitoring system, defines a possible monitoring configuration that
the monitoring system can enforce in the underlying network.
Following the example of Figure 1, two relationships of a requirement to
a single property have been defined for simplicity, although R3 includes two
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properties to be monitored, P3 and P4, for completeness. Thus, the moni-
toring configuration defines the following sensor placement: {S6, S7} → D1;
{S1, S3} → D2; and {S2, S4, S5} → D3. As a real example of these components,
in the collaborative intrusion detection network scenario introduced above, R3
could be a critical network trojan attack class through which attackers can gain
unauthorised privileges in the victim to execute any desired remote code on it.
This attack can be achieved by exploiting new vulnerabilities against the Java
Runtime Environment (JRE), discovered in recent Oracle Java SE versions. For
example, by launching a remote DoS attack to cause the Java Virtual Machine to
crash or bypass Java sandbox restrictions (vulnerability identifier: CVE-2012-
0507), or by exploiting its successor (vulnerability identifier: CVE-2012-1723)
to reach the same objectives. The latter vulnerability can be easily exploited by
using Black Hole, one of the most widely used exploit toolkit amongst hackers
nowadays. Thus, IDSs must be configured to detect both vulnerabilities, which
can be identified as P3 and P4 in the example shown in Figure 1. Note that
Snort is capable of detecting both vulnerabilities [9].
2.2. Sensor behaviour
Sensors can exhibit malicious behaviour in providing information about the
monitoring of some requirements for which they are responsible. Table 1 shows
a classification of the types of event that sensors can report.
Type Description Behaviour
True
positive
The information has been properly classified, as it is
truthful and the event has actually happened
Honest
True
negative
There is no evidence to offer any information, and
the sensor has not properly sent anything
Honest
False
positive
It is a real false positive due to a limitation or an
internal failure in the sensor’s monitoring algorithms
Honest
(HFP)
(FP) The sensor has reported on an event that it has not
actually occurred in the information system
Malicious
(MFP)
False
negative
The sensor has not reported about a real event, but
it is beyond its detection capabilities to do so
Honest
(HFN)
(FN) Intentional denial of information, as the event has
occurred and the sensor is configured to detect it
Malicious
(MFN)
Table 1: Possible sensor behaviour
A true event, either a true positive or a true negative, indicates a good
functioning of the sensor, with respect to both the proper way of monitoring
and the behaviour exhibited by the sensor. Instead, a false event can take
different meanings depending on why it has been produced. On the one hand,
a false positive is an alert generated by one or more sensors that does not
actually correspond to an existing threat attempt. This situation can be due
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to an inherent limitation in the sensor’s capabilities, or perhaps a failure in
the detection algorithms (e.g., because of too much data to be analysed or
detection rules at an inappropriate level of specificity required to detect more
or less threats [10]). This type of alert is classified as an Honest False Positive
(HFP), since it is a detection error but the sensor exhibits an honest behaviour.
Quite a different type of false positive is the one generated by sensors with
a malicious purpose. We refer to these as Malicious False Positives (MFP).
Dishonest or compromised sensors may try to disturb the proper operation of the
monitoring system in order to cause intended errors or generate confusion. For
example, a goal pursued by generating massive numbers of MFPs can be to inject
some noise to capture the attention of the administrators while camouflaging
a more important attack. Another potential objective sought by generating
MFPs is to misguide the attribution of an attack; that is, the deliberate intent
of accusing a legitimate entity of doing something that it did not do. Malicious
sensors can generate critical events from scratch using some user’s IP address as
the threat source. As a consequence, the monitoring system may trigger some
responses to fix the presumed damage caused by such a user (e.g., filtering his
IP address to deny him further access to the network). If such a user happens
to be another sensor, the system may well choose to disable it after considering
that it is not properly working, thus facilitating subsequent attacks.
A false negative is a type of event that has not been reported by the sensors
but it actually corresponds to a threat attempt. For example, this may occur
due to an evasion attack, where the malicious entity exploits some weakness
in the particular detection technology used by the sensor so that it cannot
recognise an ongoing attack [11]. Alternatively, it may simply happen that the
sensor does not have the proper capabilities to detect such an attack (e.g., an
IDS missing the required signatures). In either case, both correspond to Honest
False Negatives (HFN). Again, an entirely different situation occurs when the
sensor is properly configured to detect an event but fails to do so due to malicious
behaviour. We refer to such cases as Malicious False Negatives (MFN).
As an example of these behaviours, let us suppose that the information
system of Figure 1 receives an event about an attack related to the compromise
of R2. All sensors are configured to monitor R2 (with P2 activated). If all sensors
report it, this event can be considered as truth; that is, it is a true positive and
not an MFP. Otherwise, if there is a disagreement, e.g., some sensors report the
event while the rest do not, the following two situations can arise when assessing
the event:
• It is classified as a true positive. This implies that the sensors that did
not report on the event have misbehaved by generating an MFN; or
• Some sensors have reported about a situation that has not actually hap-
pened, thus exhibiting an improper behaviour by producing an MFP. The
remaining sensors do exhibit a good behaviour, thereby classifying the
event as a true negative.
Both alternatives, each in a separate way, can be true. The final decision
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about which one is actually true is difficult to make. In this work, we base
such decisions on the reputation of the sensors, this being a measure of how
they behaved in the past. Furthermore, other factors will also be taken into
consideration, such as the trust diversity (defined later) currently existing in the
domain and the potential impact of the presumed attack. Note also that sensors
can “misbehave” due to inherent limitations in their monitoring algorithms,
thus producing an honest mistake (i.e., an HFN in the first case and an HFP
in the latter). In both cases, sensors will be accused of malicious behaviour
and their reputation will be unfairly decreased. As a possible solution, the
monitoring system may assume sensors’ internal failures if all sensors configured
with the same detection software behave the same, provided that the population
of sensors is sufficiently high.
Assume now that an event originating at D3 in Figure 1 has been sent by
one, or two, of the three sensors deployed in such a domain. If only S4 has sent
the event, the system may consider that it is believable because the sensor has
a high reputation: Rep(S4) = 0.91. Instead, the event may be considered as an
MFP if it is sent by S2 only, whose reputation is quite low: Rep(S2) = 0.37.
Alternatively, if two out of the three sensors send the event, the decision can be
made according to the aggregation value obtained from the reputation of both
sensors. In this case, the confidence assigned to such an event E –compromise of
R2– might be T (ER2) = 0.8, if the event has been sent by S4 and S5. This means
that the event may be considered believable because T (ER2) ≥ 0.5, provided
that a threshold of 0.5 is set. Both sensors have exposed an honest behaviour,
while the lack of an alert from S2 is classified as an MFN.
Now, if the event was sent by S2 and S5, the confidence that the system
can place in it is T (ER2) = 0.53. As in the previous case, the event is trusted
because T (ER2) ≥ 0.5. Nevertheless, there are other sensors in the same domain
that did not send the event, despite having a reputation higher than the two
sensors that did it. In this case, we need to take into account other factors when
assessing this situation. In this work, we propose to use a measure of the trust
diversity in the domain. Roughly speaking, this is a measure of the variability
in trust values of the deployed sensors. Consider, for example, that the event
comes from D1. As both sensors have similar trust values, the trust diversity in
such a domain is quite low. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that both sensors
behave similarly. If only one of them reports the event, the system will not
be able to discern what is going on. Although each sensor’s reputation has a
medium/high value (Rep(S6) = 0.64 and Rep(S7) = 0.73), it will not be easy
to determine if it is an MFN or not. Subsequently in this paper, we suggest
to reconfigure the system with a new sensor placement that increases the trust
diversity while ensuring that all requirements are sufficiently covered.
3. Adaptive model: dynamically reconfiguring sensors
This section describes an adaptive model aimed at lessening potential uncer-
tainty in the events received from the monitoring system. One of the major
goals pursued here is to improve the quality of the decision-making process by
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correctly determining the truth of the information reported by sensors. Further-
more, the conclusions drawn from this analysis can be also used to re-assess our
trust in sensors’ behaviour, notably by using a reputation system. However, as
discussed in the example above, in some situations the only way to increase our
discerning power is to modify the location and/or configuration of some sensors
to ensure that a better decision will be made.
3.1. State matrix
Each state in which the system is (or was in the past) corresponds to the
monitoring configuration deployed at each moment. For our purposes, the defi-
nition of a state is given by the sensor placement –which sensors are deployed
in which domain– and the properties used in each sensor to satisfy the require-
ments demanded by each domain. Thus, a state is modelled by an m×u matrix,
where rows denote the domains defined in the information system, ∀Di ∈ D
(1 ≤ i ≤ m), and columns represent the requirements that need to be moni-
tored, ∀Rk ∈ R (1 ≤ k ≤ u), to ensure the proper functioning of the system.
Cell (i, k) in the state matrix defines the set of properties that Rk satisfies
as demanded by domain Di. All these properties are provided by the sensors
deployed in Di. Thus, each cell (i, k) in the state matrix, with 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ k ≤ u, is defined as a set of pairs <Sensor, Property>:
State(Di, Rk) = {(Sj , Pl)} = {SjPl}
where Sj ∈ S is the sensor configured with the l-th property Pl ∈ P . For
example, the state associated with the example shown in Figure 1 would be:


{S7P1} {S6P2, S7P2} {}
{} {S1P2, S3P2} {S1P3, S3P4}
{S4P1, S5P1} {S2P2, S4P2, S5P2} {S2P4, S4P3, S4P4}


Note that the number of states in the monitoring system is bounded by |S| ·
|D| · 2|P (S)| − 1. In the previous example, the system may move to one of the
21 · 221 − 1 (around 44 million) states and check if the new one is somehow
better. We next elaborate on this.
3.2. Reconfiguration architecture
The selection of a new state must be carried out so as to maximise the
information gain when identifying threats against the information system. In
our proposal, this translates into finding the best possible sensor placement
(SP) along with the appropriate (re-)configuration for each sensor. Ideally,
this decision should be made in a fully automated way, as human involvement
might not always be available, e.g., in autonomous systems, or would not be
appropriate if a fast response is required. With this aim in mind, we propose
the architecture shown in Figure 2 to automatically choose a state to move to
considering all the historical information received so far.
In our scheme, we assume that sensors’ behaviour is assessed by analysing
the events they generate. The Trust & Reputation module uses this information
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Figure 2: Architecture of the sensor reconfiguration system.
to derive a monitoring quality measure (trust diversity) for each domain. Such
an assessment is obtained by analysing three main factors for each sensor Sj :
1) the alerts reported by Sj ; 2) the alerts reported by other sensors in the
same domain as Sj (i.e., its neighbours); and 3) the capabilities of Sj and its
neighbours. The key outcome of this analysis is a trust value for each sensor,
which is used both to assess the trustworthiness of its alerts and also to measure
the trust diversity in the domain. This module is described in detail in Section 4.
Once each domain’s trust diversity is updated, the Optimisation module
decides if a reconfiguration is required and, if so, generates the best possible
sensor placement. Finding such a placement becomes essentially an optimisa-
tion problem because of the potentially huge number of states that need to be
explored. Furthermore, search proceeds over valid states only, i.e., those that
satisfy the requirements demanded by domains, as not all sensors might be ap-
propriate for all domains. This is already taken into account in Figure 2 by
explicitly using the system definition as an input to the optimisation module.
Other non-functional factors could be taken into account too. For example, in
many situations solutions that imply the smallest possible number of changes
with respect to the current deployment will be preferred, as reconfiguration may
entail some non-negligible costs. For the reasons given above, we propose to
use automated optimisation techniques, such as the ones presented for example
in [12, 13], to solve the following problem:
Find a sensor placement SP = {(Sj , Di)} that maximises Q(SP ),
minimises Cost(SP ), and such that V (SP ) = true.
whereQ(SP ) is some quality metric associated with SP ; Cost(SP ) measures
all the costs involved in applying it; and V (SP ) = true if SP is a valid solution.
In principle, the particular choice of one optimisation technique or another
is relatively unimportant as long as it provides a good enough solution. What-
ever the procedure chosen, we suggest that the trust diversity (quantified as
discussed in the next section) should be the criterion to be maximised as func-
tion Q(). The remaining important decision is choosing when to search for a
better configuration. We will address this point later on in Section 4.4.
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Once a new sensor placement is chosen, the Simulation module will proceed
to enforce the required sensor changes in the physical target system. Different
alternatives can be used to carry out dynamic reconfigurations of the monitoring
infrastructure. We next describe two possibilites:
• Reconfiguration: Each network domain keeps a copy of all sensors, but at
each given time only a subset of them is activated and properly config-
ured. When a new placement needs to be enforced, the domain receives
instructions about the new state and configuration of each sensor. This
is an easy to implement solution with current technologies. For exam-
ple, [35, 36] suggest the implementation of a Component Management
Interface (CMI) to remotely manage, configure and turn on/off software
components by making use of standards like Web-Based Enterprise Mana-
gement (WBEM) [37]. The main advantage of this solution is its low
overhead in terms of communication bandwidth, which makes reconfigu-
rations rather inexpensive. However, even though this avoids the need to
physically relocate sensors, it forces each location to maintain a pool of
available sensors.
• Reallocation: Alternatively, reallocation strategies entail a more complex
process, as sensors will be remotely installed, configured and turned on
at each location where they are needed. This is feasible with well-known
technologies such as mobile agents, where NIDSs are autonomous systems
with mobility capabilities capable of being configured at runtime. For
example, [38] proposes a Snort-based mobile agent approach.
4. Trust and reputation management system
This section describes the trust and reputation management system designed
to model the behaviour of monitoring sensors. Such a system plays a key role in
two different tasks. First, it is used to assess sensors’ honesty and, indirectly, to
quantify how trustworthy the events they generate are. In addition, trust will
be the most important factor in determining how sensors should be placed on
the system in order to maximise the overall detection quality. To do this, we
introduce one remarkably effective heuristic: trust diversity.
Roughly speaking, the idea is to guarantee, whenever possible, that sensors
with quite different trust values are jointly deployed. This fact has several
advantages. For example, it ensures that unreliable sensors are never left alone,
thus improving the quality of evidences gathered at each domain. Furthermore,
it helps to rapidly identify misbehaving sensors (e.g., by contrasting the alerts,
or the lack of them, issued by different sensors located at the same spot).
Figure 3 illustrates how monitoring evolves over time.
The state State(t) at a given time t is given by its sensor placement, included
in the monitoring configuration, and the events received. Each event Ek is sub-
sequently assigned a trust value T (Ek) indicating the likelihood of it being true
(see Section 4.2 for details). After this, the reputation of each sensor is updated
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Figure 3: State evolution over time
according to the processed events. Changes in sensors’ reputation could make
the current monitoring configuration inadequate (e.g., with domains left pro-
tected only by a few unreliable sensors). When this occurs, a new configuration
is derived and applied.
4.1. Computing trust diversity
We quantify “diversity” in a population of reputation values through a mea-
sure of dispersion [14], such as the range, the interquartile range (IQR), the
mean difference or the standard deviation, amongst others. Whatever the spe-
cific measure used, trust diversity is computed amongst the sensors’ reputation
at three different levels: 1) at the requirement level, to guarantee the truth-
fulness of the events reported by sensors that have been assigned to monitor a
given requirement; 2) at the domain level, to ensure that all its requirements
are being monitored by a sufficiently capable set of sensors; and 3) globally at
the information system level, to guarantee that the sensor placement is good
enough to lessen the uncertainty about the current situational picture. We next
discuss in detail each one of them.
4.1.1. Trust diversity at the requirement level
Besides measuring diversity in sensors’ reputation values, one major aspect
at this level is the risk (or impact) associated with each monitored requirement.
The trust diversity of a requirement Rk ∈ R, demanded by a generic domain Ω
and denoted TDΩ(Rk) ∈ [0, 1], is obtained as:
TDΩ(Rk) = max{RepΩ(SRk)} ·ψ(RepΩ(Sj,Rk) ·µΩ(Rk,Sj )), ∀Sj ∈ SP (Ω) (1)
where max{RepΩ(SRk)} is the highest reputation value amongst all sensors
assigned to domain Ω that monitor the requirement Rk; ψ is a measure of
dispersion amongst the reputation of sensors in Ω monitoring Rk; RepΩ(Sj,Rk)
represents the reputation of the j-th sensor assigned to Ω and configured to
monitor Rk; and µΩ(Rk,Sj ) ∈ [0, 1] defines the risk incurred if requirement Rk
is not satisfied, this being monitored by Sj .
Note that, in the above formula, dispersion is weighted by the maximum
reputation amongst sensors. This guarantees that diversity is greater as the
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reputation values of the sensors are higher. For example, assume two monitoring
configurations where two sensors monitor the same requirement. The reputation
values are 0.1 and 0.4 in the first case, and 0.6 and 0.9 in the latter. If we choose
the range as measure of dispersion, the value is the same in both cases (ψ = 0.3).
However, the trust diversity of the first configuration would be worse.
Finally, µΩ(Rk,Sj ) can be defined according to the impact associated with
a compromise of Rk and the number of properties configured in the sensors to
monitor Rk. Thus, the risk associated with Rk can be computed as:
µΩ(Rk,Sj ) =
ImpΩ(Rk) · |PΩ(Sj,Rk)|
|PΩ(Rk)|
(2)
where ImpΩ(Rk) corresponds to the impact for Ω when Rk is compromised;
|PΩ(Sj,Rk)| is the number of properties configured in Sj to monitor Rk; and
|PΩ(Rk)| is the total number of properties required to monitor Rk in Ω. For
example, for the monitoring configuration shown in Figure 1, the trust di-
versity of requirement R1 demanded by D3 would be TDD3(R1) = 0.1622,
using the range as measure of dispersion. The complete computation would be
TDD3(R1) = 0.91 · ((0.91 · 0.81)− (0.69 · 0.81)), knowing that R1 is being moni-
tored in D3 by a single property of both S4 and S5 (the other sensor deployed in
such domain, S2, is not configured to monitor R1). Furthemore, RepD3(S4) =
0.91 –the sensor in D3 with the highest reputation–, RepD3(S5) = 0.69 and 0.81
represents the impact for D3 if R1 –ImpD3(R1)– is compromised. Following the
same example, the remaining equirements demanded by D3 –R2 and R3– would
have TDD3(R2) = 0.2002 and TDD3(R3) = 0.574.
4.1.2. Trust diversity at the domain level
After computing the trust diversity for each requirement, the trust diversity
for the same generic domain Ω, TDΩ ∈ [0, 1], can be obtained through an
aggregation operation as the one defined in (3).
TDΩ =
ΦΩ(R)⊕
k=1
TDΩ(Rk) (3)
where ⊕ is an aggregation operation; ΦΩ(R) is the total number of require-
ments demanded by Ω; and TDΩ(Rk) represents the trust diversity of the k-th
requirement demanded by Ω, computed in (1).
Various aggregation operations can be used here, notably average values
such as the arithmetic or harmonic mean. For example, the trust diversity of
D3 in the configuration shown in Figure 1 would be TDD3 = 0.3121, if the
arithmetic mean is used in (3) as aggregation operation; or TDD3 = 0.2325 if
the harmonic mean is chosen. (These figures come from aggregating the trust
values of each individual requirement as detailed at the end of the preceding
section: TDD3(R1) = 0.1622, TDD3(R2) = 0.2002 and TDD3(R3) = 0.574.)
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4.1.3. Trust diversity at the information system level
The trust diversity on the entire system is computed similarly by aggregating
each domain’s diversity:
TDIS =
ΦIS(D)⊕
i=1
TDDi (4)
where ⊕ is again an aggregation operation; ΦIS(D) is the total number of
domains that comprise the information system; and TDDi represents the trust
diversity of each domain, ∀Di ∈ IS, computed in (3).
Finally, Table 2 presents a summary of the notation used above, including
where each symbol is defined and used, together with a brief description.
Function Eq. Used Description
TDΩ(Rk) (1) (3,5) Trust diversity of requirement Rk that is demanded
by a generic domain Ω
RepΩ(Sj,Rk) (1,6) Reputation for Ω about a sensor Sj assigned to it
that monitors Rk
ψ (1) Measure of dispersion chosen by the administrator
µΩ(Rk,Sj ) (2) (1,7) Risk for Ω if Rk, monitored by Sj , is not satisfied
ImpΩ(Rk) (2) Impact for domain Ω if Rk is compromised
PΩ(Sj,Rk) (2) Set of properties configured in sensor Sj , deployed
in Ω, to monitor Rk
PΩ(Rk) (2) Set of properties demanded by Ω to monitor Rk
TDΩ (3) (4) Trust diversity of a generic domain Ω
⊕ (3,4,5) Aggregation operation chosen by the administrator
ΦΩ(R) (3) Total number of requirements demanded by Ω
TDIS (4) Trust diversity at the information system level
ΦIS(D) (4) Total number of domains of the information system
Table 2: Functions and variables for computing trust diversity
4.2. Behavioural sensor modelling
When the monitoring system receives a new event from one or more sensors,
it first assesses the trust in that event being true and, subsequently, updates
the reputation of the sensors associated with it. Note that the set of sensors
associated with an event includes not only those that reported it, but also those
that should have reported it and did not issue any alert.
We denote events by ERk to emphasise that they refer to a particular re-
quirement Rk. To compute the trust in a new event, the monitoring system
takes into consideration the (dis)agreement level reached by all the sensors con-
figured to detect such an event, the number of domains where the event has
been produced and the trust diversity in all these domains. Thus, the trust on
a new event, denoted as T (ERk) ∈ [0, 1], is given by:
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T (ERk) =
ΦD(ERk )⊕
i=1
|δDi(ERk)| · TDDi(Rk) (5)
where ⊕ is an aggregation operation; ΦD(ERk) represents the number of
domains where the event E reporting on the compromise of Rk has been gene-
rated; δDi(ERk) is the absolute agreement level reached by the sensors deployed
in the i-th domain Di, related to the generation of ERk ; and TDDi(Rk) is the
trust diversity of each Di where ERk has been generated, as given in (1). Note
that the aggregation operations chosen for (3), (4) and (5) can be different.
Trust in an event, as defined in (5), expresses the confidence that the moni-
toring system can place in such an event when it is reported by sensors, either as
a consequence of an honest behaviour, producing a true positive, or exhibiting
a malicious behaviour, producing an MFP. T (ERk) only computes the trust on
ERk indicating whether it is truthful or not. The discrimination between both
types of events is achieved by the agreement level amongst sensors.
The agreement level reached by sensors follows a voting-based scheme that
takes into account the reputation of the sensors that have sent the event ERk
and those that have not done it but however are configured to detect it. Hence,
the agreement amongst the sensors of a domain Ω involved in reporting ERk ,
denoted as δΩ(ERk) ∈ [−1, 1], can be computed by using (6).
δΩ(ERk) =
ΦSΩ (ERk )∑
j=1
RepΩ(Sj,Rk)
ΦSΩ(ERk)
−
ΦSΩ (¬ERk )∑
j=1
RepΩ(Sj,Rk)
ΦSΩ(¬ERk)
(6)
where ΦSΩ(ERk) is the number of sensors deployed in Ω that have sent the
event ERk , while ΦSΩ(¬ERk) is the number of sensors in Ω that did not report
it; and Rep(Sj,Rk) represents the reputation of the j-th sensor deployed in Ω
that is configured to monitor Rk. A neutral agreement, i.e., δΩ(ERk) = 0,
indicates total uncertainty on whether ERk is actually a true or false positive.
Similarly, δΩ(ERk) = 1 indicates full confidence on the fact that the event is a
true positive reported by sensors we trust, while δΩ(ERk) = −1 indicates full
confidence in ERk being an MFP coming from dishonest sensors.
As sensors can report their detection responses about the same event in
different time instants, it is required to establish a mechanism that allows the
monitoring system to gather all instances of an event before knowing the proper
agreement level reached by sensors (i.e., before executing the previous voting-
based scheme). In this sense, many research works in IDS-based solutions make
use of the concept of time window, where events are gathered in a given period
of time of, for example, two seconds [8].
Note that the agreement function in (6) is a straightforward majority-based
voting scheme. More complex procedures can be used, for example, by clustering
sensors’ reputation according to their trust diversity. For the purposes of this
work, the choice of which scheme to use is quite irrelevant, as long as they
provide a good (dis)agreement level when assessing an event.
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Once T (ERk) is obtained, the system can decide if the event is reliable
enough to be considered as truthful. The simplest way to do this is by checking
whether T (ERk) ≥ Tσ, where Tσ is some minimum confidence threshold set by
the administrator. Richer decision models are possible too. For example, events
can be grouped into different classes according to their trust, so priority will be
given to those more trustworthy. How such information is used is an element
external to our system.
4.3. Updating sensors’ reputation
The overall trust value derived for each event can be used to update the
reputation of all the sensors associated with it. Associated sensors will be then
rewarded or punished, increasing or decreasing their reputation depending on
the global assessment of the event and their behaviour in reporting it.
The reputation update process takes into account three factors: 1) the global
assessment of the event, explained in the previous section; 2) the behaviour
observed for each sensor, i.e., if it reported the event or not, and if it should
have done so; and 3) a mechanism to adjust reputation over time, so that recent
behaviours weigh more than older ones. Thus, the reputation of sensor Sj at
time t, denoted as Rep(Sj)
(t), is updated as follows:
Rep(Sj)
(t) = ω ·Rep(Sj)
(t−1) + (1− ω) ·
ΦSj (E)∑
k=1
Sat(Sj , Ek) ·µ(REk,Sj ) · ξ(Ek)
ΦSj (E)
(7)
where Rep(Sj)
(t−1) is the latest reputation stored for Sj ; ΦSj (E) represents
the total number of events in which Sj has been involved, either because it has
sent the event or because it failed to report when it is configured to detect it;
Sat(Sj , Ek) ∈ [0, 1] is the satisfaction with the behaviour shown by Sj regarding
the k-th event; µ(REk,Sj ) is the risk associated with the requirement affected by
Ek, computed in (2); and ξ(Ek) ∈ [0, 1] is a forgetting factor for the time passed
since Ek was reported up to the current time t. The weight of each term in (7)
is controlled by ω ∈ [0, 1], which accounts for the importance of past behaviour.
The satisfaction model for the behaviour of a sensor Sj involved in a par-
ticular event Ek, denoted Sat(Sj , Ek), depends on the trust placed in such an
event during its assessment –given by (5)– and the subsequent action taken by
Sj with respect to that event: reporting or not. This satisfaction is computed
as:
Sat(Sj , Ek) =


|δ(Ek)| if (T (Ek) ≥ Tσ ∧ Sj ⊆ GS(Ek))
∨ (T (Ek) < Tσ ∧ Sj * GS(Ek))
−|δ(Ek)| otherwise
(8)
where |δ(Ek)| is the agreement level reached by sensors deployed in the same
domain as Sj , computed in (6); T (Ek) is the trust on Ek, computed in (5); Tσ
is the threshold set by the administrator to decide whether Ek is trustworthy
or not; and GS(Ek) is the set of sensors that have generated Ek.
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This satisfaction with events contributes to the reward or punishment of
sensors in reputation terms. If the event is considered genuine and it has been
sent by the sensor, or if it is not genuine and it has not been sent by the sensor
–it is not an MFP–, the sensor will be rewarded by increasing its reputation.
Otherwise, if the event is genuine and the sensor did not report it –it is an
MFN–, or if it actually did not happen and the sensor reported it –it is an
MFP–, the sensor will see its reputation decreased.
Finally, it is also crucial to incorporate a suitable time-dependent function
to model the weight of sensor behaviours exhibited at different time instants.
For example, it seems reasonable that recent behaviours should have more im-
portance than those observed time ago. Such a function is generally known
in the literature as a forgetting factor [15], and it is often modelled as a linear
function where the relative importance between two events maintains a constant
proportion over time. Other alternatives exist. For example, humans tend to
give more importance to the difference between events if they are recent [16].
In this work, we follow this approach and model the forgetting factor as:
ξ(Ek) = e
−∆t(Ek)
λ
(9)
where ∆t(Ek) is the difference between the current time and the time when
the event Ek was generated; and λ defines the variation of the forgetting factor
by giving higher or lower values to the events generated more recently. The
effect of this weight is graphically illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Importance of events over time (forgetting factor)
The importance of an event may vary considerably over time depending on
λ. For example, events are quickly forgotten when λ = 1/3, and the diffe-
rence between events has a similar importance from a certain point on. On the
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contrary, for λ = 5 recent events maintain a high importance but are rapidly
forgotten.
4.4. Evolving towards a new state
There are several reasons to switch from a monitoring configuration to a
new one. One natural goal is to improve the monitoring quality in terms of
the requirements demanded by the information system. Another could be to
rapidly identify dishonest or incapable sensors, even if in doing so we leave some
parts of the system with a deficient protection.
In this work, we choose the overall trust diversity as an indicator of the
monitoring quality. Note that, because of the way that we have defined it, it
can be easily understood as a measure of the quality of the placement. Thus,
when it is too low, we have no means to detect dishonest behaviours exhibited
by sensors and, therefore, the situational picture is no longer useful.
As discussed in Section 4.1, trust diversity is defined at three different levels.
Consequently the reconfiguration decision can be made at any of them. However,
moving sensors amongst domains can potentially affect various diversity values,
which might force us to recompute trust diversity at upper levels. This fact does
not imply that further computations are required. For example, all sensors will
keep the same reputation score they had before enforcing the new monitoring
configuration, regardless of whether they are relocated or not. Reputation would
only change when their behaviour is subsequently assessed by using (7), provided
that the trust diversities have changed due to the new neighbouring sensors’
reputation.
As for when a reconfiguration should take place, one could check if the trust
diversity for each requirement Rk –computed in (1)– is below some tolerable
threshold. Thus, if TDΩ(Rk) < TDΩ,σ(Rk), the monitoring system should
move to a new state that provides such a protection. Alternatively, reconfigu-
ration may be triggered by thresholds associated with the trust diversity at the
information system or at the domain level. Note that it is perfectly possible to
define different thresholds for different requirements and different domains.
Decisions about reconfiguring sensor placements can be driven by more com-
plex rules. For example, sensors may be dynamically deployed when needed.
In [8], it is suggested to count the number of events received in a predefined
time window and pay more attention, e.g., by assigning more sensors, to those
domains where more events are happening. We suggest keeping an eye on the
converse too, i.e., to sensors that report too little, as this might be evidence of
MFNs.
Finally, and as we did previously, Table 3 summarises functions, variables
and other parameters introduced above to model sensor behaviour.
5. Experimental results
In this section, we discuss some experimental results obtained with a proto-
type implementation of the ideas presented in this paper. The fundamental
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Function Eq. Used Description
T (ERk) (5) (8) Trust on an event E that affects requirement Rk
ΦD(ERk) (5) Total number of domains where E affecting Rk
(ERk) was reported
δΩ(ERk) (6) (5,8) Agreement level reached by the sensors deployed in
domain Ω involved in reporting ERk
ΦSΩ(ERk) (6) Number of sensors deployed in Ω reporting ERk
ΦSΩ(¬ERk) (6) Number of sensors deployed in Ω not reporting ERk
Rep(Sj)
(t) (7) Reputation of sensor Sj at time t
Rep(Sj)
(t−1) (7) Latest reputation of Sj
ω (7) Weight balancing the importance between past and
current behaviours
ΦSj (E) (7) Number of events E in which Sj was involved
Sat(Sj , Ek) (8) (7) Satisfaction on Sj ’s behaviour in reporting Ek
ξ(Ek) (9) (7) Forgetting factor for Ek
Tσ (8) Threshold set by the administrator to decide if an
event is trustworthy or not
GS(Ek) (8) Set of sensors in S that reported Ek
∆t(Ek) (9) Time difference since Ek was reported
λ (9) Weight putting higher or lower importance on
events reported more recently
Table 3: Functions and variables involved in modelling the behaviour of a sensor
aim is to demonstrate how the joint operation of reputation, trust diversity and
reconfiguration strengthens the quality of network monitoring, both increasing
the quality of the assessments made about the information received from sensors
and adapting the sensor system accordingly.
5.1. Experimental setting
We have built a simulator that allows us to specify information systems
(in terms of domains and requirements) and monitoring capabilities (number
of sensors, their features and their location), as discussed above. A simulation
takes as input these two specifications and the sequence of events that will
take place: where and when attack attempts will happen and which sensors are
progressively compromised. At each time instant, a number of such events takes
place and the affected sensors respond in accordance with their reputation by
reporting or not. Once all alerts have been received, the system assesses the trust
in the reported event, updates sensor reputations and decides on reconfiguration,
if needed.
In the experiments described below we have used an information system
composed of 20 domains, 10 requirements and 500 sensors. For simplicity, only
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one property per requirement is considered. Each sensor’s initial reputation is
assigned a random number in [0, 1].
In order to demonstrate the benefits of reconfiguration, we used a simple
optimisation algorithm to search for new placements. Over the last decades,
problems with a very similar structure have been approached by means of heuris-
tic optimisation procedures, in some cases with remarkable results such as the
ones presented in [17, 18]. In our case, we used a variant of a simulated an-
nealing algorithm [19], which can be viewed as a basic hill-climbing algorithm
coupled with the probabilistic acceptance of non-improving solutions [20].
The search starts at some initial solution S0 ∈ S, where S denotes the entire
solution space. We represent placements as unique assignments of each sensor
to one domain. The algorithm employs a control parameter T ∈ R+ known as
the temperature. This starts at some positive value T0 and is gradually lowered
at each iteration, typically by geometric cooling: Ti+1 = αTi, α ∈ (0, 1). At
each temperature, a number MIL (Moves in Inner Loop) of neighbour states are
considered. A candidate state C in the neighbourhood N(Si) of Si is obtained
by applying some move function to Si. In our case, this consists of randomly
deciding whether to swap the location of two sensors, or randomly picking one
sensor and moving it to a different domain. In this process, it is guaranteed
that the detection requirements are satisfied.
The new solution is accepted if it is better than Si (as measured by a fitness
function F : S → R). To escape from local optima, the technique may also
accept a candidate that is slightly worse than Si, meaning that its fitness is no
more than |T lnU | lower, with U a uniform random variable in (0, 1). As T
becomes smaller, this term gets closer to 0, so as the temperature is gradually
lowered it becomes harder to accept worse moves. In our case, function F is
simply the trust diversity of the information system.
The algorithm terminates when some stopping criterion is met, usually after
a fixed number MaxIL of inner loops have been executed, or when some maxi-
mum number MUL of consecutive inner loops without improvements has been
reached. The basic algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Basic simulated annealing for maximisation problems
1: S ← S0
2: T ← T0
3: repeat
4: for MIL times do
5: Pick C ∈ N(S) with uniform probability
6: Pick U ∈ (0, 1) with uniform probability
7: if F (C) > F (S) + T lnU then
8: S ← C
9: end if
10: end for
11: T ← αT
12: until criterion is met
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Simulated annealing offers a good balance between simplicity of the optimi-
sation procedure and quality of the found solutions. This was the main reason
for choosing it for rapid prototyping and experimentation. As shown later, such
a simple search mechanism suffices to find significantly improved placements.
Note, however, that optimality is not guaranteed, and more sophisticated opti-
misation algorithms will very likely provide better solutions. In practice, the
choice of one optimisation algorithm or another will depend on a number of
factors, including the time betwen reconfigurations, the place where the search
will take place (centralized vs. distributed), etc. In any case, we emphasise that
the specific optimisation procedure is an external element to our proposal and
different schemes can be used as long as they improve trust diversity.
In our simulations the search for a better placement is triggered when trust
diversity falls below a given threshold. (This depends on the choice of measure of
dispersion and aggregation operations.) The search parameters certainly need
some tuning depending on how much time is given to searching for a better
placement.
5.2. Experiment 1: Improving trust assessment
In this first experiment we show how trust assessment on the events –T (Ek),
computed in (5)– varies depending on the trust diversity amongst sensors in
a given sensor placement. Thus, the agreement level reached by sensors in
assessing such events will be a key factor in deciding if they are truthful. If not,
they will be discarded to achieve a better detection coverage.
Let us consider the monitoring configuration shown in Figure 5a. Each row
in the map represents a domain and each column represents a requirement. A
cell (i, j) is given a colour indicating the trust diversity of the j-th requirement in
the i-th domain. A gray scale has been used, with darker colours indicating low
trust diversity and vice versa. IQR has been chosen as measure of dispersion,
as defined in (1). Cells represented with a × indicate that the domain does
not require protection for such a requirement. In the figure, the trust diversity
values for each domain and for the entire placement are shown too.
The placement shown in Figure 5a corresponds to the one existing at a given
simulation time, whereas Figure 5b shows the placement configuration suggested
by the Optimisation module. We can observe that the trust diversity increases
considerably in all the domains, resulting in an overall increase of 92.24% (it
jumps from 0.4277 to 0.8222).
In order to compare both monitoring configurations, we simulated 2000
events (1000 true positives and 1000 MFPs) and evaluated the overall trust
assessment obtained depending on sensors’ reports, as defined in (5). The repu-
tation of each sensor remains the same in order to maintain the same experi-
mental conditions for both configurations. Table 4 shows the average results
obtained. Four different measures of dispersion have been chosen for (1) and
four aggregation operations are used for (5).
As shown in Table 4, the average trust that the system derives for the same
events varies considerably from the initial sensor placement –Figure 5a– to the
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Figure 5: Getting a more reliable new state
Measure of dispersion
Aggregation
operation
Absolute
difference
Standard
deviation
Mean
difference
IQR
In
it
ia
l
S
P Minimum value 0.0663 0.0233 0.0189 0.0273
Maximum value 0.4698 0.1541 0.1682 0.2892
Arithmetic mean 0.2587 0.0800 0.0862 0.1377
Harmonic mean 0.1927 0.0525 0.0636 0.0898
F
in
al
S
P
Minimum value 0.1129 0.1086 0.0751 0.0973
Maximum value 0.4837 0.4748 0.4308 0.9062
Arithmetic mean 0.2885 0.3658 0.3269 0.6013
Harmonic mean 0.2351 0.2653 0.2277 0.3315
Table 4: Average trust on events for different measures, operations and sensor placements
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new monitoring configuration with higher trust diversity amongst its sensors
–Figure 5b. Results also vary depending on the particular choice of functions
used in (1) and (5). In our experiments, we found that the best performing
aggregation operation is the arithmetic mean, while the standard deviation and
IQR tend to offer the best results as measures of dispersion.
It is worth mentioning that the trust threshold used to accept or discard
an event is a critical factor. Tσ should be defined in a different way depend-
ing on the choice of functions. For example, if Tσ = 1/3 (marked in bold in
Table 4) and the arithmetic mean and the standard deviation or IQR are cho-
sen, then all events will be discarded in the initial sensor placement (SP) as
they are not reliable enough. Better results could be obtained using the abso-
lute difference and the maximum, although they are functions that do not take
into consideration the data distribution; only two sensors are required, one with
the highest reputation and another with the lowest one, to reach the maximum
trust diversity. Instead, the standard deviation, mean difference and IQR gene-
rally provide better results as they consider not only the data dispersion but
also their distribution. Experiment 3, presented later in Section 5.4, analyses
in more depth the influence of the trust threshold in accepting and discarding
events for a given measure of dispersion and aggregation operation.
The increase in the trust assessment over these events translates into a better
discrimination between honest and bogus events (i.e., between true positives
and MFPs, respectively). This is directly related to the level of agreement
reached amongst the sensors affected by an event. The average agreement levels
amongst sensors in the initial sensor placement, computed in (6), are 0.3139 and
-0.3102 in assessing honest and bogus events, respectively. Although the average
trust on such events is quite low, as shown in Table 4, sensors do not reach a
satisfactory agreement level, demonstrating the uncertainty in assessing what
is really happening. Instead, agreement levels reach 0.7253 (honest events) and
-0.7098 (bogus events) in the final sensor placement, thus providing sufficient
agreement to accept or discard them.
The overall consequences of such an improvement translate into a remarkable
improvement in detection quality, as shown in Table 5. We have set a minimum
threshold of 0.5 to consider an agreement level amongst sensors as satisfactory;
that is, δΩ(ERk) ≥ 0.5 in (6).
Honest events Bogus events
Accepted Discarded Accepted Discarded
Initial SP 61 939 942 58
Final SP 843 157 159 841
true positive MFN MFP true negative
Table 5: Events accepted and discarded depending on agreement levels reached by sensors
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5.3. Experiment 2: Resilience to misbehaviour
Apart from the benefits in terms of detection quality, analysed and discussed
in the previous experiment, sensor placements with higher trust diversity show
higher resilience to the presence of malicious or unreliable sensors. We have
explored this in a second set of experiments. Starting with a given monitoring
configuration, we simulate how the system is affected by an increasing number
of compromised sensors that report falsely. At each step, i.e., with a given
percentage of compromised sensors, we inject 2000 events as before (half honest,
half bogus) and compute the overall trust derived by the system for each one
of them. Figure 6 shows the distribution (box plots) and average values (lines)
of trust values for two monitoring configurations with low (blue) and high (red)
trust diversity.
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Figure 6: Distribution of trust values over events for varying number of compromised sensors
There is a common behaviour in both cases: trust decreases as the num-
ber of malicious sensors increases, reaching a minimum when the disparity in
their reputations is maximal (i.e., around 50% of each type). From that point
on, malicious behaviour prevails and honest sensors are incorrectly accused of
misbehaving by the weight of the majority. This will inevitably affect their
reputation and, indirectly, those of dishonest sensors too, which will see their
reputation increased. As a consequence, trust will increase again, although now
the system is completely deceived in its perception of what is really happening.
Note that this is unavoidable in any trust-driven system.
However, trust diversity makes a difference here. Firstly, as discussed in
the previous experiment, trust in events increases dramatically with an opti-
mised configuration. This is clearly noticeable here. Besides, the overall trust
comparing the two monitoring configurations as the number of malicious sen-
sors increases, i.e., the decreases in both curves, is larger in the final sensor
placement than in the initial one. This can play a key role in detecting which
25
parts of the detection network are being compromised (e.g., by observing that
trust across all registered events gets lower and lower). Indirectly, the same
phenomenon could be observed in the dynamics of reputation values for the
population of sensors.
If the pace at which sensors are compromised is not very high, the adminis-
trator will notice this through a progressive decrease in the trust of the alerts.
Contrarily, in placements with low trust diversity, this fact is more difficult to
detect: an adversary can compromise sensors one by one, at a slow pace, and
no significant changes in the overall trust might be observed.
5.4. Experiment 3: Assessing agreement levels amongst sensors
Having demonstrated the resilience to misbehaviour in trust terms our last
experiment shows how trust diversity affects the agreement levels reached by
sensors when the fraction of malicious sensors varies over time. We have run a
new set of experiments using the same monitoring configurations described in
the first experiment and shown in Figure 5. As before, the reputation of the
sensors remains the same to maintain the same experimental conditions.
In this experiment, we run several simulations increasing the number of
malicious sensors at each step, injecting 1000 honest events classified as true
positives and, finally, computing the number of such events that are accepted
by the system, indicating a minimum satisfaction in the agreement level reached
by sensors according to several trust thresholds Tσ. Figure 8 shows the results
for both monitoring configurations, where each curve reflects the number of
events accepted for a given percentage of malicious sensors and for a fixed trust
threshold; that is, we increase Tσ progressively to force greater agreement levels
amongst sensors, computed as in (6), in order to accept an event as truthful.
Note that no bogus events are injected here, as the curves will follow patterns
complementary to those shown here.
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Figure 8: Agreement levels reached by sensors as they are progressively compromised
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Similarly to the previous experiment, agreement levels in both monitoring
configurations decrease as the number of malicious sensors increases, achieving
better results with the final sensor placement as it properly classifies a greater
number of events for a given trust threshold. For example, the initial sensor
placement with Tσ = 0.4 presents similar results –number of accepted honest
events– than the final sensor placement with Tσ = 0.9, a much more ambitious
trust threshold for concluding that an event is true.
Another interesting conclusion can be drawn from the rate at which curves
decrease as the number of malicious sensors increases. The drop for the initial
sensor placement is more pronounced than for the final one. For example, for
dotted lines in Figure 8, the range between 40% and 60% of malicious sensors
delimits two zones with the greatest fall in agreement level terms for both config-
urations. For the initial sensor placement, the curve falls to 36.96% on average
for a trust threshold range between 0 and 0.3, i.e., 0 ≤ Tσ ≤ 0.3, whereas
there is a fall of 34.18% for the final sensor placement. This difference becomes
greater when Tσ ≤ 0.2 (from 43.16% to 36.3%). This fact translates into better
agreement levels –higher resilience– to the presence of malicious sensors when
using a monitoring configuration with higher trust diversity.
It is also worth noting that, although the initial sensor placement provides
a better result when there is a 40% level of malicious sensors with Tσ = 0 (783
versus 714 accepted events), the remaining figures, more realistic from a trust
threshold perspective, are worst when compared to the final sensor placement.
6. Related work
Collaborative Intrusion Detection Networks (CIDN) were developed with
the aim of detecting attacks where pieces of evidence need to be gathered at
different network locations and subsequently correlated. Besides, they can also
reduce the costs involved in threat mitigation by sharing intrusion detection
resources amongst networks [21].
A CIDN consists of multiple distributed detection units (sensors) logically
organised in a network topology. In centralised systems, such as DIDS [22],
DShield [23] and NSTAT [24], each sensor shares alerts with a central correlation
unit. Hierarchical approaches, e.g., GrIDS [25], EMERALD [26] and DSOC [27],
attempt to address the scalability issues of centralised approaches by organising
detection units into a tree-like topology. Finally, fully distributed approaches
operate with nodes participating in a periodic exchange of information, such
as DOMINO [28] or the one proposed in [29] for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks.
We refer the reader to [1] for a more comprehensive account of existing CIDN
technologies.
CIDN involving different partners are rare nowadays, as organisations are
particularly reluctant to share useful information with almost any other actor.
Trust plays an important role in CIDN. In most cases, the overall detection accu-
racy depends on all parties exhibiting honest behaviour, particularly in terms of
the trustworthiness of reported alerts. These issues are ignored or inadequately
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addressed in existing CIDNs, in part because most of them were not conceived
for collaborative detection by multiple and heterogeneous organisations.
Trust diversity has been already identified as a key concept in the literature
related to optimising cooperation between the members of a group. Essentially,
all works in this area are related to socio-economic disciplines and mainly focus
on dealing with human subjects that act as sources of information. In general,
each source is modelled by a number of features, such as age, gender, salary, work
position or role within the organisation. For example, in [30, 31], the authors
presented two models to measure the impact of diversity when establishing a
group of people for the purpose of developing information system projects. Nat-
urally, factors other than diversity are also considered when establishing a work
group, like potential conflicts of interests, difficulties in personal relationships,
communication between members or expected contributions by each member.
In the context of intrusion detection networks, a number of works (such as
the ones presented in [32, 33]) use the concept of diversity in detection capa-
bilities to increase robustness when detecting security threats (e.g., by using
different detection techniques and configurations to monitor the same set of re-
quirements). Nevertheless, as far as we know none of them applies diversity to
trust with the aim of increasing the quality and resilience of collaborative attack
detection.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first to suggest using
trust diversity within a computational environment and, particularly, amongst
monitoring sensors by using their reputation as input to compute it. Trust and
reputation are two main concepts in this work used to assess and improve the
quality of information sources –sensors– in a sharing environment. In other
areas, such as heterogeneous systems, trust and reputation management is a
widely studied issue [34, 39], although none of these works focus on assessing
information sources related to detection capabilities.
In this context, [3, 40] are amongst the first initiatives that evaluate mali-
cious attitudes of IDSs. In [3], a trust-based framework to avoid sharing bogus
alerts within collaborative intrusion detection networks was presented. How-
ever, this proposal is restricted to the management of Host-based IDSs (HIDS).
Network-based IDSs (NIDS) were excluded from this framework, thus ignor-
ing the detection of critical attacks that can only be observed by inspecting
network packets (e.g., very common probe attacks like IPsweep, launched in
the first stages of a multi-step attack to discover available services in the tar-
get network). Furthermore, this approach does not consider the reoutational
differences amongst HIDSs. On the other hand, the work presented in [40]
proposed a complete trust and reputation system for HIDSs and NIDSs, in-
cluding their management in intra- and inter-domain environments. However,
no distinction is made amongst different sensors, e.g., using their reputation,
to maximise information gain through the trust diversity of the domain where
they are deployed.
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7. Conclusion and future work
Distributed and collaborative attack detection environments present many
challenges. Dealing with the potentially massive numbers of events generated by
sensors distributed over network locations is difficult. The situation is further
complicated by the fact that reports may come from different organisations
that choose to share information but that do not fully trust each other. In
this work we have presented a novel approach to increase the quality of the
assessments made about such alerts, providing, at the same time, the basis for
decision-making processes resilient to malicious reporting, either by dishonesty
or compromise.
We have introduced the notion of trust diversity and argued that it helps in
deriving optimal monitoring configurations. In particular, we have proposed a
way of quantifying such a measure in order to use it as an evaluation function
when choosing amongst configurations. The trust assessment system proposed
in this work allows us to determine if an alert should be believed or not. In turn,
this can be leveraged to re-assess our perception of sensors’ honesty (through
reputation) so as to make better decisions in the future and/or choose better
monitoring configurations. We have reported our experiences through simula-
tion, showing that this scheme can play an important role in improving the
quality of collaborative attack detection.
Our work can be extended in a number of ways. Reputation is but a proxy
for trust in behaviour; the way we use it here might be enhanced by incorporat-
ing other factors when assessing each sensor’s reputation (e.g., known failures
or some particularities of its operation environment). Furthermore, we have
not elaborated on how trust assessments about events can be combined to, for
example, perform alert correlation or match them against an attack graph. We
have intentionally avoided discussion of potential restrictions on what sorts of
reconfiguration are possible. For example, not all domains might accept a given
sensor. We believe that such restrictions can be easily modelled and incorpo-
rated into the optimisation process.
We also plan to test our proposal in a real-world scenario. This will allow us
to doscover further complexities and issues arising from our model. Similarly,
the integration of our reputation model and reconfiguration procedures into a
real CIDN will prove valuable. In principle, such integration should not incur
substantial costs, but first-hand experience will be essential to refine and/or
re-design some system components.
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